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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah R. App. Proc. R. 45. This Court granted 
certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals entered in case number 
20070548, which affirmed a grant of summary judgment by Judge Kate Toomey, of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered on June 13, 
2007, in Case No. 050914998. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court granted certiorari on one issue in its Order dated October 8, 2008: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in its analysis of Petitioner's "active 
participation" argument. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals' decision 
for correctness. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, f 8. The review focuses on whether 
the court of appeals correctly reviewed the trial court's decision, in this case, to grant 
summary judgment to Dave Roth Construction, under the appropriate standard of review. 
Id. An appellate court reviews a trial court's "legal conclusions and ultimate grant or 
denial of summary judgment" for correctness, id, and views "the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993); Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, Tf6 
(Utah 2008). 
vi 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The Court of Appeals entered its opinion in a Memorandum Decision (Not for 
Official Publication) filed on June 26, 2008, cited as 2008 UT App. 240, a copy of which 
is attached as Addendum A herewith. Within its opinion, the Court of Appeals 
extensively addressed the Appellants' "active participation" arguments, and found, as did 
the District Court, as a matter of law, that Dave Roth Construction was not liable for the 
physical injuries to Celso Magana under the retained control doctrine. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This cases arises out of a construction site accident occurring on April 29, 2005, in 
which Celso Magana was injured while working as a laborer for Circle T Construction. 
Dave Roth Construction ("DRC") was the general contractor on the project, and Circle T, 
Magana's employer, was the framing subcontractor at the site of a new Weinerschnitzel 
restaurant. ABM Crane Rental was hired to lift the load of roof trusses off of a truck and 
place them as needed by Circle T for building construction. During the off-loading 
process, the load became unbalanced, slid, and fell on Magana. He was severely injured 
and is now a paraplegic. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Trial Court and Court of 
Appeals. 
Magana brought suit against DRC and ABM Crane. Magana settled with ABM 
Crane, and DRC moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted in favor 
of DRC, which resolved Celso's final claims against the only remaining party. Magana 
appealed the decision of the trial court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
Magana filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted by this Court. 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented. 
1. Identification of the Parties. 
DRC was hired to act as the general contractor on a project involving the 
construction of a Wienerschnitzel restaurant. (R. 729.) Dave Roth is the owner of DRC. 
(R. 729.) Brett Campbell was DRC's superintendent on the project. (R. 729.) On the 
date of the accident, Brett Campbell was the only DRC employee on the work site at the 
time of the accident.1 (R. 729-30.) According to Dave Roth, DRC's role in the 
construction project was to provide a finished building for the owner, to secure 
subcontracts from subcontractors for the owner, and to purchase building materials for the 
project. (R. 730.) DRC solicited bids from several framing subcontractors, including 
Circle T Construction, which was awarded the job. (R. 730.) 
1
 Although Brett Campbell testified that another DRC employee came to the work site on that 
morning, it is unclear whether the other employee, "Giovanni," was working on the subject 
Wienerschnitzel property, or on an adjacent property, on which DRC was also performing 
construction work. Nevertheless, there is no testimony that Giovanni had anything to do with 
Circle T's work or the crane operations on the date of the accident. 
viii 
DRC had not worked with Circle T on any other projects. (R. 730.) During the 
bid process, Dave Roth spoke with Ted Alexander, the owner of Circle T regarding Circle 
T's qualifications. (R. 730.) Circle T submitted a bid proposal to DRC to provide 
"framing labor, including crane." (R. 730.) Circle T's bid for framing labor and crane 
work was $13,500.00, which DRC accepted (R. 731.) 
2. Facts Relating to Circle T's Work on the Date of the Accident. 
On the day before the accident, Brett Campbell was notified that truss joists would 
arrive the next day and would need to be offloaded by a crane. (R. 731.) Brett Campbell 
notified Ted Alexander that his truss joists for the roof would be arriving and advised him 
to have a crane available for offloading the joists. (R. 731.) Ted Alexander learned that 
the crane company Circle T normally used would not be available in the morning of April 
29, 2004, and asked Brett if he could help him contact another crane company: 
Q. When you hire a crane, or when you arrange for crane service 
now for the jobs you're doing, who do you hire? 
A. Mostly Great Basin, or a company called Raw, R-A-W, and 
Raw probably does 90 percent of my work. 
Q. Do you know why it was that Dave Roth Construction 
arranged for this particular crane from ABM on the day Celso 
was hurt? 
A. Because the guys I was normally using were unable to get 
there at a time to be able to unload that truck, because the 
truck had a schedule to keep. 
(R.731.) 
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Because Circle T's crane company was not available, Brett Campbell and Ted 
Alexander agreed that both they would call some other crane companies, and that the first 
crane that could make it to the project at the time needed would be hired: 
Q. Okay. So how did Brett go about arranging the crane? Did 
you just tell him that the guys we normally hire aren't 
available, do you want to see if you can find somebody? How 
did that conversation work? 
A. Well, all I remember on this deal, I needed a crane to set some 
beams for me, and we had been waiting on these trusses to get 
there. Getting trusses there on-site was not part of my deal. 
Getting the beams lifted was part of my deal. If I remember 
correct, the conversation was, we'll get a crane, split the costs, 
you know, you pay part for getting the stuff unloaded. I'll pay 
my part for getting my stuff put up. And then it just becomes 
a matter of I'll call my guy, you call your guy, and whoever 
can get here when we need them, that's who we use. 
(R. 732.) 
Before the date of the accident, Circle T had used its own crane company to 
perform lifting work: 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
In terms of using a crane, had Circle T used a crane on this 
Wienerschnitzel project? 
Yeah. 
Before the date? 
Yeah. 
Which crane company did that work? 
Great Basin Crane. 
And could Great Basin not show up on the day — 
He just was busy. He couldn't come. 
(R. 732.) 
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ABM Crane's owner is Eric Johnson, who stated that if he had billed for ABM's 
work, he would have billed the crane work to DRC. However, he also admitted that he 
did not know whether DRC would turn around and bill ABM's work to Circle T. (R. 
732-33.) Dave Roth testified that if he had received a bill from ABM for crane services, 
he would have simply passed the bill on to Circle T, whose bid proposal required Circle T 
to pay for crane services. (R. 733.) 
Ted Alexander acknowledged in his deposition that unloading the trusses by crane 
from the flatbed was solely Circle T's responsibility: 
Q. Okay. So when you talked about what you wanted to unload, and 
where you wanted to unload the trusses or joists, Brett Campbell 
didn't give you any input about that, correct? 
A. (Witness shakes head.) 
Q. Would you expect Brett to be part of that discussion? 
A. No. 
Q. To tell you how — 
A. No, it's not part of the job. 
(R. 734.) 
Ted Alexander further clarified that Circle T, alone, without the assistance of 
DRC, handled the responsibility of off-loading framing materials: 
Q. On any other occasion, did Brett take the responsibility on 
himself to take framing materials and, like, haul them off a 
truck and put them on the work site, or actually up into the 
building? 
A. No. 
Q. Was that something that Circle T handled alone? 
A. Yes, unless the lumber company off-loaded it. 
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(R. 734-35.) This testimony clearly establishes that it was not DRC's custom and 
practice to help Circle T off-load construction materials from a delivery truck. (Id.) 
On the date of the accident, Circle T's employees, including Celso Magana, Brody 
Tolman, and the owner, Ted Alexander, began work at 6:30 a.m. (R. 735.) The accident 
occurred at approximately 7:30 a.m., and before that time, Circle T's employees were 
waiting for the crane to arrive. (R. 735.) When the crane arrived on the job site, Ted 
Alexander spoke with Alex Valdez, who was the crane operator, and directed him where 
to set up the crane: 
Q. When the crane showed up and got set up on the 
Wienerschnitzel site, did you get together with your 
employees and Alex, the crane operator, to talk about what 
was going to be lifted or what was going to go on? 
A. Yep. 
Q. Tell me what that, to the best of your memory, what that 
conversation consisted of. 
A. It was basically, here's the truck, here's what we want off, 
this is where we want to put it. 
(R. 735.) 
Because Circle T was in charge of the truss off-loading operation, Tex Alexander 
testified that he directed the ABM crane operator where to set up the crane and where to 
off-load the trusses. (R. 329.) Ted Alexander confirmed that Brett Campbell was not part 
of the meeting between he and the crane operator, and Brett Campbell did not direct the 
crane operator where to set up the crane: 
Q. Now, was Brett Campbell a part of that meeting? 
A. No, he wasn't even there yet, or had barely just showed up. 
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Q. Okay. So when you talked about what you wanted to unload, 
and where you wanted to unload the trusses or joists, Brett 
Campbell didn't give you any input about that, correct? 
A. (Witness shakes head.) 
Q. Would you expect Brett to be part of that discussion? 
A. No. 
(R. 735-36.) 
Alex Valdez, the crane operator for ABM, also confirmed that Brett Campbell did 
not participate in the meeting and did not instruct him where to set up the crane. (R. 736.) 
Alex Valdez positioned the crane and stated that Brett Campbell played no part in 
positioning the crane, as follows: "No person from Dave Roth Construction assisted me, 
or directed me regarding the positioning [of] the crane." (R. 736.) 
The crane operations that led to the accident involved unloading two bundles of 
38' x 20" truss joists from the semi to the job site: 
Q. Tell me exactly what was being unloaded from the truck that 
day. 
A. If I remember correctly, 38-foot high joists, 20 inches deep, 
two bundles. I believe you have pictures that show you. 
(R. 737.) Before the bundles of joists were offloaded from the semi, they had to be 
"rigged"or attached to the hoist. Ted Alexander testified that he performed the rigging of 
the joists: 
Q. We do. And then who rigged the straps? 
A. I did. 
Q. Hold on just a second. You know what I'm going to ask, but 
just so we have a clear record. You rigged the joists? 
A. Mm-hmm. [Affirmative] 
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Q. And did Brett Campbell tell you how to rig the joists, or where to rig 
them? 
A. No. 
(R. 737.) Alex Valdez confirmed that no person from Dave Roth Construction played 
any part in selecting the rigging or setting the rigging for either of the two loads that were 
lifted, as follows: "No person from Dave Roth Construction played any part in 
determining the type of straps or tag line to use." (R. 737.) Valdez further testified that 
"Mr. Alexander set all the rigging on each of the two loads that were lifted that day" and 
"[n]o person from Dave Roth Construction played any part in setting the rigging for either 
of the two loads that were lifted," (R. 737.) 
After the first load of joists were lifted, Alex Valdez testified that the straps and 
tag line were removed by Circle T's employees and again given to Ted Alexander, and 
that no person from Dave Roth Construction controlled, directed or played any part in 
overseeing the lifting or moving set of the first load of joists. (R. 505.) Nor did anyone 
from Dave Roth Construction direct, advise or control Circle T's employee in accepting 
the first load. (R. 738.) Valdez also confirmed that Ted Alexander set the rigging on the 
second load, and that no person from Dave Roth Construction played any part in rigging 
the second load. (R. 738-39.) Valdez stated that to the best of his memory, two 
adjustments were made to the straps by Ted Alexander to level out the load, and then it 
was lifted slowly. (R. 739.) No person from Dave Roth Construction played any part in 
adjusting the rigging for the second load after the test lift, nor did any person from Dave 
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Roth Construction play any role in lifting the second load. (R. 739.) Alex Valdez further 
confirmed that at no time did he witness any person from Dave Roth Construction direct, 
control, advise, or in any other way play a part in Circle T's and ABM's lifting, rigging 
and setting down either of the two loads. (R. 739.) During the lifting process, no person 
from Dave Roth Construction instructed Circle T's employees where to stand or how to 
handle the load as it was being lifted. (R. 739.) Valdez did not witness any person from 
Dave Roth Construction direct, control, or instruct Circle T's employees, who were 
accepting the loads as they were lifted over the fence at any time. (R. 739-40.) 
Brody Tolman, who was one of Circle T's employees, was working down on the 
ground along with Magana at all relevant times. Tolman confirmed that nobody from 
DRC was involved in rigging the trusses and at the time of the accident, although he 
believed Brett Campbell to be in the area next to the semi-truck. (R. 740-41.) Brody 
Tolman also could not recall Brett Campbell, or anyone else from DRC, instructing either 
Ted Alexander or Alex Valdez about which straps to use to rig the truss joists, or how to 
rig the joists. (R. 741.) Brody Tolman confirmed that no one from DRC told him or 
Magana where to stand, or not to stand in the drop zone, nor did anyone from DRC 
instruct them how to guide loads of trusses over a fence. (R. 741.) 
3. Description of DRC s and Brett Campbell's Work on the Project. 
Brett Campbell testified that, as superintendent for DRC, he inspected the 
subcontractors' work, made sure the work is being done correctly, and ensured the quality 
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control of work on the project. (R. 741.) Because restaurant construction often involves 
very precise building requirements, Brett Campbell testified that he laid out ("chalked" or 
"snapped") the lines for the walls on the project, prior to Circle T beginning its work. (R. 
741.) The testimony of witnesses also indicates that despite Circle T's bid proposal, 
which included providing the crane, Brett Campbell contacted ABM Crane to do the 
crane work on the date of the accident. (R. 742.) Brett Campbell and Ted Alexander 
both testified that Circle T's regular crane company could not be at the construction site 
when the truss joists were being delivered, and Ted and Brett both agreed that they would 
try and contact another crane company: 
Q. In terms of using a crane, had Circle T used a crane on this 
Wienerschnitzel project? 
A. Yeah. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Before the date? 
Yeah. 
Which crane company did that work? 
Great Basin Crane. 
And could Great Basin not show up on the day -
He just was busy. He couldn't come. 
(R. 742.) 
Because Circle T's crane operator could not get to the construction site, Brett 
Campbell contacted ABM Crane to perform the work. (R. 742.) Brett Campbell testified 
that he contacted ABM as a favor to Circle T and to keep the work moving according to 
schedule. (R. 742-43.) 
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4. DRC Provided the Building Materials for the Project, but Circle T 
Always Offloaded the Material onto the Project Site. 
DRC solicited "labor only" bids from subcontractors. (R. 743.) ItwasDRC's 
intent to purchase the building materials for the project, and arrange for shipping of the 
materials to the project site. (R. 743.) However, once the materials arrived on the site, it 
was the responsibility of the subcontractor to off-load the materials, and place them where 
the subcontractor could most easily utilize the material. (R. 743.) With regard to the 
framing materials used by Circle T, including wood and more specifically, the truss joists, 
Ted Alexander testified that Brett Campbell did not tell him where to unload or place 
those materials on the project: 
Q. Okay. So when you talked about what you wanted to unload, 
and where you wanted to unload the trusses or joists, Brett 
Campbell didn't give you any input about that, correct? 
A. (Witness shakes head.) 
Q. Would you expect Brett to be part of that discussion? 
A. No. 
Q. To tell you how -
A. No, it's not part of the job. 
(R. 744.)2 
5, Celso Magana's Testimony and Specific Recollection of Brett 
Campbell's Participation in Rigging the Truss Joists on the Accident 
Date. 
During morning questioning at Celso Magana's deposition, he testified that he did 
2
 Although Ted Alexander's act of shaking his head may be somewhat ambiguous, it is clear 
from subsequent questions and Mr. Alexander's answers that Circle T did not receive instruction 
from Brett Campbell regarding where to place the truss joists, as that was not part of Brett's job. 
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not know who Brett Campbell was: 
Q. Do you know who the general contractor on the Wiener Schnitzel 
project was? 
A. No, I never knew who it was. 
Q. Do you know who Brett Campbell is? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever speak with a man named Brett Campbell on the 
restaurant project or the Wiener Schnitzel project? 
A. Maybe, but I never knew who it was. 
(R. 444.) 
Later in his deposition, Celso testified additionally as follows: 
MR. ROBSON: Let me ask it this way: Is it Celso's testimony that 
there was a second individual that helped rig the second load of 
trusses? 
A. Yes. 
MR. ROBSON: Did he know this individual's name? 
A. No. 
Q. (BY MR. ROBSON) Had you seen the individual on the job before 
the day of your accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many times do you believe you had seen him? 
A. Almost every day. 
Q. Do you believe if you were shown a picture of this individual, you 
could identify him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. I'm sorry I have this only on a computer. 
*** 
Q. (BY MR. ROBSON) Celso, do you recognize this individual? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who is he? 
A. He is the one that was helping Ted. 
Q. He was helping Ted on the second load. That is the load that fell on 
you; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. ROBSON: For the record, this video is of Brett Campbell's 
videotaped deposition; is that correct, Pete? 
xviii 
MR. BARLOW: Yes. 
(R. 455.) 
The manner in which Plaintiff was shown and asked to identify the photograph of 
Brett Campbell was improper. Plaintiff may not have been able to recognize Brett 
Campbell from his photo had the identity of Brett Campbell not been suggested to him 
before his attorney showed him the picture. A proper identification of Brett Campbell's 
photo would have been of it in a line up with other random photographs. In light of 
Plaintiffs earlier inconsistent testimony on the subject, Plaintiffs identification of Brett 
Campbell's photo after the identity was already suggested to him by his attorney is 
insufficient. (R. 744-45.) 
However, Magana also testified that no one other than Ted Alexander told him 
how to perform his work on the Wienerschnitzel project. 
Q. And on the Wiener Schnitzel project, did the general contractor ever 
tell you how to do your framing work? 
A. I don't understand. 
Q. Did the general contractor on that Wiener Schnitzel project ever tell 
you how to do your framing work? 
A. Which general contractor? 
Q. Any general contractor. 
A. No. 
Q. Other than Ted, did anybody on that Wiener Schnitzel project ever 
tell you how to your work? 
A. No. 
Q. Other than Ted, did anybody else ever interfere with your work? 
A. No. 
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(R. 746.) Celso testified that on the three or four occasions when Anderson Lumber or 
any other lumber provider delivered to the construction site, only Circle T employees off-
loaded the materials. 
Q. . . . Just so we're clear, prior to the accident, how many times did 
Anderson Lumber or any other material provider deliver lumber to 
the construction site? 
A. I am not sure, maybe three or four times. 
Q. And each of those times, who offloaded those materials? 
A. Ted or Brody. 
Q. But it was someone from Circle T; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On any of those three or four occasion, did anybody help Ted or 
Brody offload those materials? 
A. No. 
(R. 746.) 
Celso further testified that only Ted Alexander directed the crane operator on the 
positioning of the crane to off-load the truss joists. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
When the crane arrived, did anyone speak with the crane operator? 
Just Ted. 
Did - - who told the crane operator, if you know where the crane 
should be positioned? 
Ted. 
Did you see Ted speak with the driver of the truck that brought the 
truss joists? 
Yes. 
Did you see anybody else speak with the crane operator before the 
lifting operations started? 
No. 
Did you see anybody else speak with the driver of the truck that had 
the truss joists before you began offloading those truss joists. 
No. 
(R. 448-49.) 
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Celso's testimony shows that he has no personal knowledge that anyone other than 
Ted Alexander directed Alex Valdez where to position the crane to off-load the truss 
joists. (Id.) Celso and every other witness testified that Ted Alexander is the only person 
who had conversations with Alex Valdez. Thus, no one else could have directed Valdez 
regarding where to position the crane. (R. 747-49.) 
With regard to off-loading the truss joists, Celso testified that none of the other 
workers on the project site besides Circle T workers and the crane operator helped off-
load the truss joists: 
Q. At the time that you were offloading the truss joists from the truck, 
was anybody else besides you and Brody and Ted and the crane 
operator on the project site? 
A. Yes, the other workers were there. 
Q. Do you know who those other workers were? 
A. No. 
Q. Did any of the other workers come help you offload the truss joists? 
A. No. 
(R. 747-48.) Celso then testified that Ted Alexander rigged the first load of truss joists, 
and that he did not see anyone other than Ted Alexander rig the second load of truss 
joists: 
Q. So who put the straps around the first load of truss joists? 
A. Ted. 
Q. Only Ted? 
A. I don't know for the first time if the other guy was there for the first 
one. 
Q. And then who put the straps around the second load of the truss 
joists? 
A. I didn't see anyone. 
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(R. 453. Emphasis added..) 
Celso also stated clearly in his deposition that did not see anyone other than Ted 
Alexander rig the second load, so he can not testify from personal knowledge that Brett 
Campbell helped Ted Alexander rig the second load of truss joists: 
Q. And then who put the straps around the second load of truss 
joists? 
A. Ted. 
Q. And did anyone else help Ted put the straps around the second load? 
A. I didn't see anyone. 
Q. Now, it was the second load that slipped and fell on you; correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 453. Emphasis added.) 
A lunch recess was taken during direct examination of Celso by DRC's counsel 
from 12:01 p.m. to 1:32 p.m. (R. 748-49.) Direct examination of Plaintiff was 
completed at approximately 2:42 p.m. and a recess was taken until 2:48 p.m. when 
Celso's attorney, began his cross-examination. (R. 749.) At the outset of cross-
examination, Celso changed his testimony and stated that a second individual helped Ted 
Alexander rig the second load of truss joists: 
Q. Celso, I have just a couple of questions for you with 
regard to your testimony today, is that okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I understand your testimony related to who it was 
that rigged the trusses for lifting off the truck, I am 
talking about the second load of trusses that there was 
a second individual; is that correct? 
MR. BARLOW: Objection. Misstates his prior testimony. 
MR. ROBSON: Let me ask it this way: Is it Celso's testimony that 
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there was a second individual that helped rig the 
second load of trusses? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 455.) 
Celso's testimony regarding whether a second person helped Ted Alexander rig the 
truss joists is admittedly inconsistent. However, when Celso was questioned further by 
DRC's counsel, he admitted that he did not see anyone help Ted put the straps around the 
second load of truss joists: 
Q. So who put the straps around the first load of truss joists? 
A. Ted. 
Q. Only Ted? 
A. I don't know for the first time if the other guy was there for the first 
one. 
Q. And then who put the straps around the second load of the truss 
joists? 
A. I didn't see anyone. 
(R. 749-51.) 
Ultimately, Celso admitted that Ted Alexander was in a better position to know 
who put the straps around the second load of truss joists, and Celso stated that he would 
defer to Ted's testimony rather than his own: 
Q. You said earlier that Ted was on the truck at the time the 
second load of truss joists was being rigged or the straps were 
being put around that second load of truss joists; correct? 
A. Yes, he was up on the truck. 
Q. Okay. And would you agree that Ted would be in a better 
position to know who put the straps around that second load 
of truss joists? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Would you defer to what Ted said about who put the straps on 
the second load of truss joists? 
THE INTERPRETER: Defer meaning are in agreement or -
Q. (BY MR. BARLOW) Would you defer to his testimony? 
A. What do you mean? I don't understand. 
Q. Okay. Defer is a - has a specific meaning. Because Ted was 
in a better position to know who put the straps around the 
second load of truss joists, would you defer to his testimony 
rather than what you said earlier? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 751-52.) 
6. The Truss Joist Off-loading Operation was Always Under Circle T's 
Direction and Control. 
Despite Plaintiffs less than unequivocal claim that Brett Campbell assisted Ted 
Alexander in rigging the second load, Brett Campbell does not recall helping Ted 
Alexander rig either the first or second load of truss joists on April 29, 2005. (R. 752-53.) 
This testimony was elicited from Brett Campbell in a subsequent affidavit after his 
deposition. It is entirely consistent with his deposition testimony and serves only to 
clarify an important issue. (R. 752-53.) Moreover, Ted Alexander does not recall that 
Brett Campbell helped him rig either the first or second load of truss joists on the date of 
Celso Magana's accident. (R. 465.) Similarly, this testimony was elicited from Ted 
Alexander in a subsequent affidavit after his deposition. It is entirely consistent with his 
deposition testimony and serves only to clarify an important issue. (R. 753-54.) Celso 
has not established that the information contained in the affidavits is inconsistent with 
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prior deposition testimony and the affidavits are permitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
establish undisputed material facts. 
Brett Campbell and Ted Alexander, who Plaintiff admits was in the best position 
to provide testimony on the issue, both state that the off-loading of the truss joists was 
under the direction, supervision and control of Ted Alexander and Circle T Construction. 
(R. 754-55.) Giving the benefit of any doubt to Celso, despite the fact that he changed 
his testimony, both Brett Campbell and Ted Alexander state in their affidavits that if Brett 
Campbell did help Ted Alexander rig either of the two truss joist loads, he was helping 
Ted Alexander under Ted's direction and Ted retained complete control of Brett's work. 
(R. 755-56.) Both Brett Campbell and Ted Alexander also testified that Brett Campbell 
did not direct, instruct or control the manner in which the truss joists were off-loaded by 
Ted Alexander and Circle T Construction. (R. 756-57.) Ted Alexander stated 
specifically in his affidavit that he, on behalf of Circle T, retained complete control of the 
truss off-loading operation which resulted in Plaintiffs' injuries. (R. 757-58.) Celso 
admitted that, despite his changed testimony that Brett Campbell helped rig the second 
load, (giving all benefit of doubt to the Plaintiff), he could not say that the side of the 
load, which he claims Brett Campbell rigged, was the side which slipped and allowed the 
load to land on him. 
Q. When were you not looking? 
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A. I wasn't seeing who was tying incorrectly on one side or who was tying 
incorrectly on the other side. 
Q. And why weren't you seeing that? 
A. What I will say is that one of the two are at fault. One did not — one tied it 
incorrectly. 
Q. Any you -
A. I don't know if it was Ted or other person, but I know it was one of them at 
fault that this thing fell on me. 
Q. But you don't know - you don't know who put the straps on the side that 
fell on you? 
A. No. 
(R. 458.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly analyzed and applied the "active 
participation" standard in affirming the decision of the trial court to grant summary 
judgment for Dave Roth Construction. "Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 
'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to 
another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.'" Thompson v. Jess. 1999 
UT 22,1f 13. 
This "active participation" rule was recently analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Begaye v. Big D Construction. 2008 UT 4, a case similar to the instant case. In 
Begaye. the Supreme Court held that the general contractor did not actively participate in 
causing the injury to the plaintiff, which was caused by a falling wall, and the general 
contractor was not liable under the retained control doctrine, because it did not exercise 
sufficient control over the method and manner of the construction of a concrete 
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subcontractor. Id. at f^ 11. The Court also noted that although the general contractor 
controlled the sequencing of the wall construction and the workflow generally, it had no 
discretion or control regarding the specifics of how the wall was built or which bracing 
method was to be used. In fact, the employees of the subcontractor testified that the 
subcontractor exclusively controlled the way in which it was constructed. Under those 
facts, the Supreme Court held that the general contractor could not be held liable to for 
the injuries of a subcontractor's employee under the active participation element of the 
retained control doctrine. 
Similar to the general contractor in Thompson and Begaye, DRC is not liable for 
injuries to Magana, because DRC did not control the means or methods by which Circle T 
and ABM Crane off-loaded the truss joists from the semi truck. It is clear, under Utah 
law, as stated by the Court of Appeals that "active participation" does not mean "mere 
participation," but rather, requires that a general contractor control the manner in which 
the injury producing event occurs. Well-established case law shows that "active 
participation" requires that the principal employer must exert such control over the 
means utilized that the contractor cannot cany out the injury-causing aspect of the work 
in his or her own way. If a general contractor does control the work, only then may it be 
held liable under the retained control doctrine. However, it is equally clear that DRC did 
not exert that type of control over the work that led to Mr. Magana's injuries. 
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In this case, the undisputed facts showed that DRC did not direct or control the 
work of Circle T or ABM Crane, and more specifically, did not control the manner and 
means by which Circle T unloaded the truss joists from the semi- truck, which was the 
instrumentality of Plaintiff s injuries. Moreover, the witnesses have testified 
unanimously that DRC did not direct the manner in which ABM Crane, the crane 
company that lifted the loads, performed its work. Based on the undisputed facts, 
reasonable minds could not disagree that DRC did not actively participate in the work of 
Circle T or ABM Crane, and therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment for DRC on all of Plaintiff s claims. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY 
FOLLOWED AND APPLIED WELL-ESTABLISHED 
UTAH LAW REGARDING THE ACTIVE-
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT BECAUSE DRC 
DID NOT CONTROL THE METHOD OR OPERATIVE 
DETAILS OF THE TRUSS OFF-LOADING PROCESS 
WHICH CAUSED MAGANA'S INJURIES. 
A. General participation in a project by a contractor does not give 
rise to liability for accidents to a subcontractor's employees, 
Utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an independent 
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the 
contractor or his servants." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, f 13 (Utah 1999)(quoting 
RESTATEMENT § 409; see Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting 
applicability of general rule and certain exceptions). This general rule recognizes that one 
who hires a sub-contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which the 
sub-contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the 
manner or method of performance implemented. See W. Prosser & W. Keaton, THE LAW 
OF TORTS 509 (5th ed. 1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, 
where the principal employer does not control the means of accomplishing the contracted 
work, the sub-contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for 
preventing the risk [arising out of the work], and administering and distributing it." Id. 
The Maganas improperly attempt to broaden the concept of "active participation" 
by making (oft rejected) arguments that DRC should be liable for Mr. Magana's injuries, 
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because DRC participated generally in the construction of the project. Examples of 
unpersuasive arguments are found in Magana claims that "active participation" is 
demonstrated by DRC's responsibility for overall safety (Appellants' Brief at p. 6), or by 
arranging the delivery of the truss joists to the work site, or coordinating contact between 
Ted Alexander (Magana's supervisor) and the truck driver, and the crane operator. 
Similar arguments have been consistently rejected by the Utah Court in Thompson, 
Begaye, and by the Court of Appeals in affirming summary judgment in this case. 
Magana misreads Thompson, and nothing in Magana's brief lends legitimacy to 
his argument that activities that all general contractors perform on all construction sites, 
but which do not constitute direct control over the means or methods, or the operative 
details, of the injury producing event, can create liability upon a general contractor. 
The retained control doctrine was formally adopted in Utah in Thompson v. Jess. 
1999 UT 22, and the doctrine found its genesis in section 414 of the Restatement, which 
states: 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the 
control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to 
others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable 
care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable 
care. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). 
Thus, it is well-settled in Utah that the active participation standard requires a 
principal employer to have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative 
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detail of the work that caused the injury. Thompson v. Jess. 1999 UT 22, ^ 20. This 
Court in Thompson specifically defined the active participation requirement by 
instructing that: "[t]he employer must have retained at least some control over the manner 
in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the 
work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe 
alterations and deviations." Id. (Emphasis added. Quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 414 cmt. c. (1965)). The phrase "manner in which the work is done" is critical, 
because it instructs that a general contractor cannot be held liable for injuries arising out 
of a sub-contractor's work, unless and until it is shown that the work was being carried 
out in the manner prescribed by the general contractor. If the manner which the work is 
being done is prescribed by the subcontractor, then the subcontractor should bear the fault 
for any resulting injuries. 
Moreover, with regard to the term "work", used by the Thompson v. Jess court, 
Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr.. Inc.. 2005 UT App 38, (Utah App. 2005), has already 
addressed the issue of whether the "injury causing aspect of the work" relates in a broad 
or narrow sense in construction cases, and the appellate courts have rejected arguments 
similar to those made by the Mananas, which have sought to broaden the meaning: 
Plaintiffs argue that in this case "control over the manner" of the 
"injury-causing aspect of the work" relates broadly to all carpentry 
activities, including framing, of the church. On the other hand, Defendants 
urge a more narrow view of the "injury-causing aspect of the work," as 
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including only the manner of framing the wall that fell on Decedent. The 
trial court interpreted "injury-causing aspect" narrowly, finding that neither 
H&W nor CPB "exerted control over the means utilized by" the framers "at 
the time of the accident." We agree with the trial court that under 
Thompson, retained control requires active participation in the method or 
operative detail of the injury-causing activity in order to impose liability. 
I d a t t l O . 3 
Rather, to trigger the exception under the retained control doctrine, and create 
liability, "the principal employer must exert such control over the means utilized that the 
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." 
Id at lf21; Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr.. Inc.. 2005 UT App 38, %9 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005); Begave v. Big D Constr. Corp.. 2008 UT 4, f 10 (Utah 2008)("the general 
contractor must exercise "such control over the means utilized that the contractor cannot 
carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the injury-causing aspect of the work was 
the off-loading of the truss joists from the semi-truck to the ground. Therefore, Magana's 
argument regarding generalized work by DRC on the contraction project, which is 
3
 This approach was followed in this Court recent decision in Begave: 
Although [the general contractor] had a general supervisory role over the project, 
including a contractual obligation to oversee employee safety, this simply does 
not equate to exerting control over the method and manner of the injury-causing 
aspect of [the subcontractor's] work. 
Begave v. Big D Constr. Corp.. 178 P.3d 343, 345, n. 2 (Utah 2008). 
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unrelated to the injury causing events, fails to show active participation by DRC. For 
example, Magana's allegations against DRC relating to the coordinating of work between 
subcontractors, or arranging delivery of materials4, or even regarding snapping the lines 
for the walls, fails to demonstrate that the Utah Court of Appeals misapplied the "active 
participation" standard in its decision. Magana must, (but has consistently failed to), show 
that DRC controlled the means and operative details utilized by Circle-T and Ted 
Alexander to offload the trusses, which directly caused Magana's injuries. 
In this case, there is no fact which Magana can point to, in order to support a claim 
that DRC exerted any control over the manner in which Ted Alexander and ABM Crane 
decided to off-load the truss joists. The undisputed facts before the trial court, the Court 
of Appeals, and before this Court, show that Circle T and ABM carried out the work in 
their own way. Therefore, active participation cannot be shown in this case. 
The Maganas' Brief is littered with implications that Brett Campbell's proximity to 
the off-loading operations must somehow give credence to the claim that Campbell 
directed or controlled the crane activities. However, no fact supports that claim. Indeed, 
Magana ignores his own sworn testimony that Ted Alexander rigged the load which fell 
on him. (R. 453.): 
Q. And then who put the straps around the second load of truss joists? 
4
 Which are activities virtually all general contractors perform on every construction site. These 
activities, if found to be "active participation" would eviscerate the retained control doctrine and 
render it meaningless. The retained control doctrine is a "narrow theory of liability applicable in 
the unique circumstance" Begaye, 178 P.3d at ^ f 8. 
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A. Ted. 
Q. And did anyone else help Ted put the straps around the second load? 
A. I didn't see anyone. 
Q. Now, it was the second load that slipped and fell on you, correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R.453.) 
The Court of Appeals, and the district court considered all of the facts alleged by 
Magana in deciding to grant summary judgment for DRC. However, Magana cannot 
show that DRC exercised control over the off-loading operations which caused Magana's 
injuries. Therefore, summary judgment, and the subsequent affirmation was appropriate. 
B, Magana claim that Brett Campbell participated in the rigging 
fails to show control over the process decided by Ted Alexander 
to off-load the truss-joists. 
Magana's less than consistent testimony relating to Brett Campbell's alleged 
participation in the actual rigging process fails to demonstrate "active participation" so as 
to impose liability on DRC. The undisputed facts before the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals showed clearly that Brett Campbell did not participate in controlling the means 
and operative details of the off-loading process, but that those details were controlled by 
Ted Alexander of Circle T. Thus, Magana cannot show active participation by DRC, 
because the undisputed facts showed that the entire off-loading process was performed 
under the direction and control of Ted Alexander, Magana's employer, and Ted 
Alexander used his own means and methods to rig and offload the trusses. 
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Recently this Court stated that "[u]nder Dayton and Thompson, [the general 
contractor] must have exercised the right to . . . control the work, not only with respect to 
the results, but also with reference to methods of procedure or means by which the result 
was to be accomplished, where the will and discretion of [the subcontractor] as to the . . . 
methods of accomplishing the results were subordinate to that of [the general contractor]. 
Begave, at If 11: Davton v. Free, 148 P. 408, 411 (Utah 1914): see also Thompson, 1999 
UT 22,118. This ruling is significant to the present case, because it shows that the Court 
of Appeals was correct in stating that "mere participation does not expose DRC to 
liability." Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, et aL 2008 UT App 240, at 3. 
Both Brett Campbell's and Ted Alexander's deposition testimony, and their 
submitted affidavits, which were made part of the record and utilized by the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals in granting and affirming summary judgment for DRC, show 
conclusively and undeniably that Ted Alexander and Circle-T, not DRC, controlled every 
aspect of the operative details and methods of offloading the trusses. The deposition and 
affidavit testimony provided the lower courts with the following undisputed facts: 
1. The off-loading of the truss joists was under the direction, supervision and 
control of Ted Alexander and Circle T Construction. (R. 461, 465.) 
2. If Brett Campbell did help Ted Alexander rig either of the two truss joist 
loads, he was helping him under Alexander's direction and Alexander retained total 
control of Campbell's work. (Id.) 
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3. Brett Campbell did not direct, instruct or control the manner in which the 
truss joists were offloaded by Ted Alexander and Circle T Construction. (R. 461.) 
4. Ted Alexander was not directed, instructed or otherwise controlled in the 
manner of off-loading the truss joists by Brett Campbell or anyone else with Dave Roth 
Construction. (R. 465.) 
These facts, which were uncontradicted in determining that summary judgment, 
undoubtedly show that DRC did not direct or control Circle-T's operations concerning the 
off-loading of the truss-joists which resulted in Mr. Magana's injuries. These facts are 
fatal to Mr. Magana's claims and show that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 
"active participation" requirement as outlined in Dayton. Thompson, and Begaye. 
Understanding that the facts do not show "active participation," Magana implies 
that DRC somehow tricked the Court of Appeals into misapplying the law, when he 
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in "looking away" from the allegation that 
Campbell may have been on the truck rigging the second load of truss joists, or that the 
Court of Appeals "fell for the defense tactic of picking individual facts out."5 Despite the 
record established in this case, in which Mr. Magana was less than unequivocal and 
conflicting in his assertions that a second person helped Ted Alexander rig the second 
load, and despite the fact that the manner in which Brett Campbell was identified was 
5
 It is incomprehensible how individual facts were picked out, when DRC's memorandum in 
support of summary judgment contained 76 statements of fact, covering 20 pages. 
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clearly improper, this allegation taken as a whole does not impose liability upon DRC. 
The Court of Appeals ruled with respect to that allegation as follows: 
The Maganas first argue that Mr. Magana's conflicting testimony about 
Brett Campbell taking part in rigging the joists creates a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether DRC actively exercised control over 
offloading the roof trusses. We are not, however, persuaded by this 
argument because mere participation does not expose DRC to liability. In 
Begave v. Big D. Construction Corp.. 2008 UT 4, 178 P.3d 343, the 
supreme court explained that liability under the "active participation" 
standard of the retained control doctrine is appropriate only "'when the 
principal employer directs that the contracted work be done by use of a 
certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which 
the work is to be accomplished.'" Id. H 9 (quoting Thompson. 1999 UT 22, 
TJ19). In other words, DRC must have "exercis[ed] 'such control over the 
means utilized that the contractor [could not] carry out the injury-causing 
aspect of the work in his or her own way.'" Id. j^ 10 (quoting Thompson. 
1999 UT 22, If 21) . Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Maganas, at best, they indicate that Campbell may have been on the 
semi-truck, assisting Ted Alexander with rigging the second load of roof 
trusses. There is, however, no evidence to indicate that Campbell exerted 
control over Alexander, or Circle T, or any part of the offloading that was 
taking place. Thus, DRC cannot be liable under the active participation 
standard of the retained control doctrine. 
2008 Ut App. 240, If 3 (emphasis in original.) 
The "active participation" requirement is further explained by the court in Smith v. 
Hales & Warner Constr. Inc. 2005 UT App 38, which clarifies that Brett Campbell's 
alleged participation does not give rise to liability on the part of DRC: 
The court went on to elaborate on the contours of the [active participation] 
standard. [Citation omitted.] The duty of care will not arise "unless the 
principal has 'actively participated' in the project." [Citation omitted.] This 
active participation standard requires that "a principal employer must 
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail 
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of" the work that caused the injury. Looking to the Restatement for 
guidance, the court noted, 
"The employer must have retained at least some control over 
the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he 
has merely a general right to order the work stopped or 
resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily 
be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations." 
quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c. (1965)) (emphasis 
added). Rather, to trigger the exception "the principal employer must 
exert such control over the means utilized that the contractor cannot 
carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." 
[Citation omitted.] 
Smith, at f 9. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court of Appeals was correct in its finding that DRC did not assert any control 
over the means and methods by which Circle-T performed its work which resulted in 
Magana's injuries, and therefore, was correct in finding that DRC did not actively 
participate in the injury causing event. Based on these facts, the Utah Court of Appeals 
correctly applied the law regarding "active participation", which was articulated by this 
Court, most recently, in Begaye. 2008 UT 4, f 9-10: 
Formally adopting an "active participation" standard, we held that "a 
principal employer is not subject to liability for injuries arising out of its 
contractor's work unless the employer 'actively participates' in the 
performance of the work." Thompson P 18. Applying this standard, we 
determined that 
a principal employer is subject to liability for injuries arising 
out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is 
actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of 
performance of the contracted work Such an assertion of 
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control occurs . . . when the principal employer directs that 
the contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or 
otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the 
work is to be accomplished. 
14119. 
Furthermore, we noted that the requisite degree of control over the 
contractor's work entails affirmatively interfering with the subcontractor's 
method of performance or instructing that a less safe method be used. See 
id. Th 22, 23 (citing Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enters.. 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d 5 
(Ariz. 1992)). 
Simply stated, the general contractor must exercise "such control 
over the means utilized that the contractor cannot carry out the 
injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." Id. U 21; see also 
Davton v. Free, 148 P. 408, 411 (Utah 1914) (stating that employers are 
liable when "the will and discretion of the contractor as to the time and 
manner of doing the work or the means and methods of accomplishing the 
results [are] subordinate and subject to that of the [general contractor.]" 
(alterations in original). 
Begaye,atT|9-10. 
Under this standard, Magana had to show that Brett Campbell actively interfered 
with the manner or methods which Ted Alexander of Circle-T chose regarding where to 
set up the crane, how the trusses were to be offloaded, what type of straps were to be 
used, how the load was to be rigged, and every other operative detail which were actually 
employed during the off-loading process which led to Magana's injury. Moreover, 
Magana was required to show that Campbell exercised such a degree of control over the 
operations that Ted Alexander could not carry out the off-loading process in the manner 
he chose. However, every fact supports DRC's position that Ted Alexander, of Circle-T, 
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carried out the off-loading procedure based on his own decisions, and according to his 
own will and discretion. Therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly 
interpreted and applied the "active-participation" standard, and correctly granted and 
affirmed summary judgment for DRC in this matter. 
Magana entirely ignores the Court's analysis of the retained control doctrine and 
the "active participation" requirement contained in Begaye, and Magana fails to cite to 
Begaye except to compare the facts of this case to the facts in Begaye which led to the 
plaintiffs injuries. Magana fails to analyze or discuss this Court's holding in Begaye, 
even though the Court of Appeals analyzed and quoted extensively from Begaye in its 
memorandum decision. Mr. Magana simply has no rejoinder to the analysis in Begaye, 
and therefore, he fails to address it. 
Instead, Magana asserts that his case is similar to Local Gov't. Trust v. Wheeler 
Machinery, 2006 UT App 513. However, that case is inapposite and entirely inapplicable 
to this case. In Wheeler, the court found that the general contractor, who was being sued 
by its client, gave verbal approval for the subcontractor's specific work which resulted in 
a fire. Additionally, the plaintiffs retained expert indicated in his report that the direction 
to make a certain part "fit" (and which resulted in the fire) came from directly from the 
general contractor, strongly suggesting that the general was directing the subcontractor's 
actions. Further, the court found that the general contractor could be contractually liable 
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for the work of the subcontractor.6 Moreover, Wheeler addressed a case in which the 
general contractor had a contract with the plaintiff, a municipality, and the court found 
that the general contractor could not escape its liability for improper performance of its 
contractual duties by claiming that the duties were delegated to a subcontractor. It is clear 
that the basic fact pattern, and the relationships of the parties in Wheeler are substantially 
different from those involved in the present case. Therefore, Wheeler is not instructive. 
Additionally, instead of applying the facts ofBegaye to the present case, Magana 
asks the Court to "imagine" a set of facts which would make Begaye similar to the 
present case. (Appellant's Brief at p. 10.) Magana then exaggerates the facts contained in 
the record (i.e., imagine a general contractor "helping lay out the re-bar walls.") in order 
make his case. Instead of imagining a set of facts, this Court has a clear set of facts which 
show that DRC played no part in directing or controlling the means or operative details of 
the crane operations which directly led to Mr. Magana's injuries. Under those facts, 
which were considered by the Court of Appeals and the district court, and which are 
present for this Court's review, summary judgment was decided in DRC's favor. 
6
 As opposed to being liable in tort, like the Maganas allege against DRC in this case. There is 
no claim for breach of contract against DRC in the present action. 
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POINT II: MR MAGANA'S INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY MAY 
BE PROPERLY DISREGARDED AS HE CANNOT 
CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
BE CONTRADICTING A PRIOR SWORN 
STATEMENT. 
There is substantial testimony from all parties, with the exception of Plaintiff 
Celso Magana, that Ted Alexander was the only person who rigged either the first or 
second load of truss joists on the day of the subject accident. (R. 737-38, 740-41, 752-
53.) 
Mr. Magana's testimony is inconsistent with his own prior testimony, and could 
have been entirely disregarded by the trial court, and Court of Appeals, under the rule 
stated in Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983), in which the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a party who takes a clear position in a deposition cannot raise an issue of 
fact by affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding which contradicts his deposition, 
unless an explanation for the discrepancy can be provided. 
Despite the apparent and still unexplained inconsistencies, it is clear that the trial 
court, and the Court of Appeals, did not have to address the issue of Magana's changed 
testimony because all of the undisputed testimony, including Mr. Magana's, showed that 
DRC did not direct or control the means or methods of Circle T's or ABM Crane's work 
which caused the accident: 
The pivotal issue in this case is whether Dave Roth Construction retained 
control over Circle T and ABM Crane, its subcontractors, such that it can be 
liable to Mr. Magana. See Smith v. Hales & Warner Construction, 2005 UT 
App. 38 (unless a general contractor exercises control over its 
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subcontractor's manner or method of performing the work, the general 
contractor owes no duty of care to the subcontractor's employees and no 
liability will attach in the event such employees are injured). The issue of 
whether a general contractor retained control over a subcontractor's work is 
usually a factual question for the jury. However, in this case, the undisputed 
facts demonstrate that Dave Roth Construction did not direct or control the 
work of Circle T and, more specifically, the "instrumentality of the 
plaintiffs injuries." In fact, there is no evidence before the Court to indicate 
that Dave Roth Construction or its employees controlled the process of 
lifting, rigging and setting down of either of the two loads of joists. 
The Court notes that the plaintiff has provided deposition testimony 
that Dave Roth Construction's superintendent, Brett Campbell, was at the 
site on the morning of the accident and participated in the unloading 
process. Dave Roth Construction correctly points out that this testimony is 
at odds with the testimony of other witnesses and is inconsistent with Mr. 
Magana's prior testimony during the same deposition. However, even 
assuming, as Dave Roth Construction does, that the plaintiff is correct in his 
assertion that Mr. Campbell helped Mr. Alexander rig one of the two loads 
of truss joists, there is still nothing to suggest that Mr. Campbell controlled 
the method or operative detail of the "off-loading process." Rather, the 
undisputed evidence indicates that the activity which caused Mr. Magana's 
injuries was controlled by Circle T and ABM Crane. Accordingly, the-
Court determines that Dave Roth Construction owed no duty of care to Mr. 
Magana and therefore grants its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 831-834.) 
Essentially, the issue of fact that Appellants attempt to create with Mr. Magana's 
changed deposition testimony is a red herring, a non-issue, and the district court and 
Court of Appeals correctly found there were no facts to suggest that DRC directed or 
controlled the offloading procedure. And therefore, summary judgment, and the Court of 
Appeals' affirmation of the same, were appropriate both under the facts of the case and 
under Utah law. 
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With regard to Appellant's assertion that Brett Campbell's alleged assistance in 
rigging the second load, under the direction of Ted Alexander, could give rise to direct 
liability, for improper rigging, the Appellants also failed to present the district court with 
any evidence to support a claim that Brett Campbell's action caused the accident. Mr. 
Magana admitted that he was not in a position to determine if Brett Campbell rigged the 
side of the load which slipped: 
Q. But if somebody is in a better position to see who actually put 
the straps on, would you defer to that person's testimony? 
That's all I am asking. 
A. I couldn't tell who was who because I wasn't looking. 
Q. When were you not looking? 
A. I wasn't seeing who was tying incorrectly on one side or who was 
tying incorrectly on the other side. 
Q. And why weren't you seeing that? 
A. What I will say is that one of the two are at fault. One did not — one 
tied it incorrectly. 
Q. And you — 
A. I don't know if it was Ted or the other person, but I know it was one 
of them at fault that this thing fell on me. 
Q, But you don't know — you don't know who put the straps on the side 
that fell on you? 
A. No. 
(R. 458.) 
Mr. Magana's testimony is clear is showing that he does not know who, in his own 
words, failed to tie the side of the truss joists which fell on him. Without that knowledge, 
a jury would be required to entirely speculate whether Brett Campbell caused Magana's 
injuries. In Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah. 970 P.2d 1265, 1272 (Utah 
1998), this Court stated that "pure speculation and conjecture cannot be allowed to form 
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the basis of a jury's verdict." Because Mr. Magana can not testify which side of the load 
of trusses fell and caused his injury, nor which side of the load Brett Campbell allegedly 
helped rig, his claims against DRC fail as a matter of law. A jury would be required to 
engage in rank speculation to determine that DRC is liable for Mr. Magana's injuries 
because of the work that Brett Campbell allegedly undertook on the second load of 
trusses. Therefore, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment for DRC. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted and applied the "active participation" 
requirement which has been set out in a long line of Utah cases beginning with Dayton v. 
Free, Thompson v. Jess. Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr, Inc., and most recently in 
Begaye. The Court of Appeals' opinion and analysis is consistent with those opinions 
which show that "active participation" requires that a general contractor control the 
means and methods of a particular activity, so as to supplant the subcontractor's 
decisions. Based on the foregoing, Dave Roth Construction requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this <^f day of December, 2008. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Peter H. Barlow 
Ryan P. Atkinson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Dave 
Roth Construction 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this <X2g day of December, 2008, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was served by the method indicated below, to 
the following: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Kevin K. Robson 
BERTCH ROBSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1996 East 6400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
005090.00065 
18 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
FILED 
F
'TAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 2 6 2008 
M 30 2008 
Celso Magana and Yolanda 
Magana, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Dave Roth Construction, ABM 
Crane Rental, and John Does I-
V, 
Defendants and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070548-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 26, 2008) 
2008 UT App 240 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050914998 
The Honorable Kate A. Toomey 
Attorneys: Daniel F. Bertch and Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Peter H. Barlow and Ryan P. Atkinson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
Celso and Yolanda Magana argue that summary judgment was 
improper because material issues of fact exist regarding whether 
Dave Roth Construction (DRC) actively participated in rigging the 
joists or in the overall construction of the project to the 
extent that DRC may be liable under the retained control 
doctrine. "Summary judgment is proper only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 
<fl 12, 979 P.2d 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review 
the trial court*s decision on "summary judgment for correctness, 
according no deference to [its] legal conclusions." Id. "We 
view [the] facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Smith v. Hales & Warner 
Constr.. Inc., 2005 UT App 38, H 6, 107 P-3d 701. 
"Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 'the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical 
harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or 
his servants.111 Thompson, 1999 UT 22, ^ 13 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)). There is, however, an exception 
to this rule, commonly referred to as the retained control 
doctrine. See id. ^ 14, Under this doctrine, "a principal 
employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its 
independent contractor's work if the employer is actively 
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance 
of the contracted work." Id. ^ 19 (emphasis added). The 
retained control doctrine "provides a !narrow theory of liability 
applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer of an 
independent contractor exercises enough control over the 
contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care.1" Begaye 
v. Big P. Constr. Corp., 2008 UT 4, 1f 8, 178 P.3d 343 (quoting 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 15) . 
The Maganas first argue that Mr. Magana's conflicting 
testimony about Brett Campbell taking part in rigging the joists 
creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DRC 
actively exercised control over offloading the roof trusses. We 
are not, however, persuaded by this argument because mere 
participation does not expose DRC to liability. In Becraye v. Big 
D. Construction Corp., 2008 UT 4, 178 P.3d 343, the supreme court 
explained that liability under the "active participation" 
standard of the retained control doctrine is appropriate only 
"'when the principal employer directs that the contracted work be 
done by use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the 
means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.'" Id. 
H 9 (quoting Thompson, 1999 UT 22, % 19) . In other words, DRC 
must have "exercis[ed] 'such control over the means utilized that 
the contractor [could not] carry out the injury-causing aspect of 
the work in his or her own way. ' " Id. 1J 10 (quoting Thompson, 
1999 UT 22, % 21), Viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Maganas, at best, they indicate that Campbell may have 
been on the semi-truck, assisting Ted Alexander with rigging the 
second load of roof trusses. There is, however, no evidence to 
indicate that Campbell exerted control over Alexander,' or Circle 
T, or any part of the offloading that was taking place. Thus, 
DRC cannot be liable under the active participation standard of 
the retained control doctrine. 
Woven into their active participation argument, the Maganas 
briefly assert that DRC is liable because it allegedly provided 
the crane used to offload the trusses. While the supreme court, 
in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P,2d 322, stated that 
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 [t]he degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal 
duty must involve either the direct management of the means and 
methods of the independent contractor's activities or the 
provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury,T" id. 
U 20 (emphasis added) (quoting Grahn v. Tosco Corp., 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 806, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), overruled in part by 
Hooker v. Department of Transp., 38 P.3d 1081, 1091 (Cal, 2002); 
Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy, 25 P.3d 1096, 1102 (Cal. 2001)), this 
statement derives from a California decision explaining that 
liability may be imposed under the retained contr.pl doctrine ,. 
"where the [employer] furnished the equipment or was obligated by 
contract to do so, and the equipment proved to be defective, 
causing injury to the employee of the independent contractor." 
McDonald v. Shell Oil Co,, 285 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1955). 
Because the Maganas have not alleged that DRC provided defective 
equipment that caused Mr. Magana's injury, the Maganas' theory 
under this aspect of the retained control doctrine also fails. 
The Maganas next argue that DRC is liable under the retained 
control doctrine because Campbell was responsible, in part, for 
the overall safety of the project. However, our supreme court 
has expressly cautioned against imposing liability under these 
circumstances. In Begaye, the court noted that 
there are serious public policy concerns in 
holding a general contractor liable for 
injuries of a subcontractor simply because it 
has a supervisory role and has closely 
monitored safety on the job site as a 
responsible general contractor should. 
"Penalizing a general contractor's efforts to 
promote safety and coordinate a general 
safety program among various independent 
contractors at a large jobsite hardly serves 
to advance the goal of work site safety." 
2008 UT 4, U 11 n.4 (quoting Martens v. MCL Constr. Corp., 807 
N.E.2d 480, 490 (111. App. Ct. 2004)); see also McDonald, 285 
P.2d at 904. Therefore, liability may not be asserted on the 
basis that DRC may have maintained a general responsibility over 
project safety. 
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the Maganas' 
argument that DRC is liable under the retained control doctrine 
because it directed, to some extent, the construction of the 
walls. In Thompson, the supreme court explained that there is a 
distinction between control over how the work is done and 
20070548-CA 3 
"control over the desired result." 1999 UT 22, ^ 24; see also 
Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr,, Inc., 2005 UT App 38, f 13, 107 
P.3d 701. Specifically, the Thompson court declined to impose 
liability under the retained control doctrine even though the 
homeowner directed where the injury causing activity would take 
place because the homeowner was merely exerting control over the 
desired result, not the manner in which the work was done. See 
1999 UT 22, M 3-4/ 26. Like the homeowner in Thompson, when 
Campbell "snapped the lines for the walls," he was merely 
exercising some control over the desired result, i.e., where the 
walls were to be constructed in accordance with the plans for the 
project. This action does not amount to control over the manner 
in which the work was done, and thus, liability under this theory 
cannot result. 
In their last effort to create liability under the retained 
control doctrine, the Maganas rely on this court1s decision in 
Local Government Trust v. Wheeler Machinery Co., 2006 UT App 513, 
154 P.3d 175. Briefly addressing the retained control doctrine, 
the Wheeler court reversed summary judgment, concluding that 
"there is sufficient evidence to create a question as to the 
applicability of the retained control doctrine" because "an 
invoice suggests that Wheeler's agents gave verbal approval for 
[the subcontractor's] work," and there was some evidence that the 
direction to adjust the injury-causing equipment came from 
Wheeler, "strongly suggest[ing] that Wheeler was directing [the 
subcontractor's] actions." Id. J^ 10. There is, however, no 
similar evidence advanced in this case suggesting that DRC 
controlled, or even influenced, the manner in which the work was 
done. Mr. Magana1s inconsistent testimony suggests that Campbell 
may have assisted Alexander, who was in charge of offloading the 
trusses; but there is no testimony suggesting that Campbell 
ordered Alexander to offload the trusses in a certain way. Thus, 
the Wheeler decision does not require us to reverse the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling. 
Finally, the Maganas argue that DRC is liable under sections 
413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Yet, the 
Utah Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this same argument in 
Thompson, stating, "Whether based on direct negligence under 
section 413 or vicarious liability under sections 416 and 427, 
these provisions have no application when the injured person is 
an employee of the independent contractor undertaking the 
allegedly dangerous work." Id. |^ 30 (emphasis added). It is 
undisputed that Mr. Magana was employed by Circle T, the company 
responsible for the framing and the roof trusses. Mr. Magana was 
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not employed by DRC. Consequently, these Restatement sections do 
not apply here.1 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm. 
/-
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
22L_ 
Jutfith M, Billings, Judge </ 
1. We decline to rule on the Maganasr remaining arguments--that 
DRC is liable under Restatement sections 323, 324, and 424, or 
under a theory of agency--because these arguments are not 
adequately briefed and the trial court did not address them. In 
their appellate brief, the Maganas cite to the Restatement 
provisions and make a general, unsupported assertion that agency 
law applies. They do not, however, provide any additional legal 
argument or authority. Thus, their arguments have not been 
properly presented to this court. See Utah R. App, P. 24(a); 
State v, Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20, 63 P.3d 72 ("[A] reviewing 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." {internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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